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The market for Pharmaceuticals is probably the most strongly segmented
and highly regulated market in the EC. Large price differences between
countries are an indication for this segmentation. At the same time, the
pharmaceutical industry in some countries such as Germany and the UK be-
longs to the most successful sectors of the economy on an international
scale.
In studies of the internal market in 1992 the prospects for a unifica-
tion of the markets for Pharmaceuticals have been seen as not too bright
(EUROPEAN ECONOMY, 1988). The expectations about the success of the
planned directives of the Commission of the EC have been reserved, al-
though some convergence of price levels was predicted. It remained un-
answered what the potential path for prices could be in the process of
unification and what welfare effects might be associated with this pro-
cess (EAG, 1988). In "The Economics of 1992" a convergence of prices to
a community average was assumed resulting in a fall of. spending on phar-
maceuticals of 720 mio. ECU or to some 3 percent in total expenditure.
In this paper a framework is developed within which the likely outcomes
of measures taken towards an internal market can be analyzed. The first
part of the paper introduces some features of pharmaceutical markets in
terms of industry characteristics and demand regulations. In addition,
the proposed measures by the Commission of the EC are summarized. In the
second part a simple model of a price discriminating monopoly is presen-
ted which is exposed to price controls in one market and which faces li-
mited arbitrage between the markets. Changes in regulations concerning
arbitrage and price controls are then investigated and the impact of
moves towards unified markets on welfare are discussed. The paper con-
cludes with some speculations about the likely process of creating an
internal market for Pharmaceuticals as it is laid out by the directives
of the EC and further planned directives.- 2 -
INDUSTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
The European pharmaceutical industry can best be characterized by its
dual structure. On the one hand, there are small companies which do not
develop new drugs, have a small R&D budget, and sell mostly to local
markets. They make up the bulk of the 2200 pharmaceutical companies in
Europe. The European market is dominated, however, by around 60 interna-
tionally operating, large, research oriented companies of which about 30
are of European origin. They control about 70-80 percent of the market
in France, Germany, Italy and the UK and most of the roughly 4-5 billion
US-$ on R&D are allocated in these companies. • .. .
These large international firms rely to a considerable extent on intra-
firm trade and production in local affiliates such that trade statistics
reveal only a small proportion of the internationalization of the market
for Pharmaceuticals. It has been estimated that imports into the EC for
1984 amount to about 1.2 billion ECU, whereas sales of local affiliates
of non-EC companies come to 7.7 billion ECU. This emphasis on local pro-
duction has two reasons: It is often claimed that the national authori-
ties involved in regulating pharmaceutical markets and in controlling
demand discriminate against imports thus forcing foreign companies to
establish local facilities. The other reason is based on the technology
of producing Pharmaceuticals.
Developing new drugs requires large investment in R&D which add up to,
e.g., DM 2915 mio. (1980) in Germany, i.e. 14.6 percent of German indus-
try turnover (BPI, 1990). This is about one third of total R&D spending
in the EC (EAG, 1988). It is estimated that the development of one new
pharmaceutical entity including unsuccessful search costs about
DM 250 mio. Since R&D projects have a low probability of success large
companies choose to work simultaneously on 8-10 projects in order to
avoid the risk of being unsuccessful overall. In addition, research faci-
lities require a minimum efficient scale for libraries, animal testing,
laboratories, etc. such that the R&D facilities are in one centralized
place, usually the headquarter of the company.
Once the chemical entity has been developed, the preparation of the ac-
tive ingredients and their conversion into dosage form are the two other
steps. Both involve some fixed costs but the optimum scale of operation- 3 -
for the preparation of the ingredient is large enough to be located in
the company headquarter whereas conversion into dosage form is largely
decentralized. This decentralization has been reported to be forced by
pressures of national authorities (EAG, 1988). The marketing of drugs
then.is a purely local activity. The production technology can therefore
roughly be characterized as one which involves sizeable fix costs but
otherwise constant marginal costs.
The decentralization of predominantly the last production step is there-
fore not necessarily forced by technological considerations. National
policies forcing companies to set up local production sites seem to be
more important. However, the cost savings of centralization are estima-
ted to be rather low. If the most economical production sites are chosen
unit costs of parmaceutical companies in the EC could fall by 0.19 to
0.61 percent or 65 to 208 mio. ECU (EAG, 1988). It is therefore not dif-
ficult for foreign firms to satisfy pressures by local authorities and
to establish local production facilities.
The demand for Pharmaceuticals is determined by complex interactions of
patients, physicians, and different health insurance systems. The choice
of the drug is largely made by the physician who is privileged to pres-
cribe ethical drugs - the dominating market segment - but he does not
pay for it. Patients who are the consumers of pharmaceuticals have in
most countries little incentive to respond sensitively to price differen-
ces of drugs. Therefore national and local health institutions have
tried to control the cost of pharmaceutical therapies in many different
ways. Except for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK, all Eu-
ropean countries use direct price controls. Additional measures include
controls on total expenditure, positive or negative lists, and direct
negotiations of health systems with the pharmaceutical industry which
also try set limits on prices in general.
These national policies to control the costs of the health system in
general and expenditures on pharmaceuticals in particular have put
forward a number of studies which have tried to identify the degree of
price dispersion within the EC. Table 1 which summarizes the results
reveals drastic price differences between high price countries like
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands - which incidently do not control
prices - and low price countries like Italy and France which limit- 4 -
prices. Also Spain and Portugal which are not included here have low pri-
ces .
These price comparisons are rather controversial since there is conside-
rable confusion as to how the commodity baskets should be selected as
there are thousands of Pharmaceuticals supplied in European markets, but
only a few are truly identical products with identical names, package
































































Source: Taken from EAG (1988), Table 4.2.
sizes etc. such that it becomes difficult to judge as to whether two
products in two different countries are identical. This problem is ag-
gravated by the fact that one important strategy of pharmaceutical pro-
ducers is product differentiation such that a comparison of truly iden-
tical drugs underestimates the degree of price dispersion. These price
differences may have been reduced somewhat in the meanwhile as the mar-
ket share of generic products has increased and the price differences of
newly introduced Pharmaceuticals have turned out to be smaller.
A stylized picture of the pharmaceutical industry would therefore look
as follows: An ethical drug which is patent-protected is usually the on-
ly product or one of very few products supplied in a specific therapeu-
tical group if one considers only the most effective drugs and ignores
older less effective ones. In many therapeutical groups there essential-
ly exists a monopoly or anokgopoly of one company for some time but no- 5 -
longer than the life of the patent. During that time market entry of com-
petitors is difficult if not impossible. The production of the drug has
high R & D costs and probably constant marginal costs of production.
BARRIERS TO TRADE
The major regulations for Pharmaceuticals concern health aspects. Every
pharmaceutical has to pass a registration procedure before it can be
sold in national markets. Proof of safety, efficacy and quality have to
be supplied by the producer. In addition, packages, labels, patient in-
formation leaflets and dosages must be approved. These characteristics
together then define a pharmaceutical product in a national market.
Strictly speaking this means that two products sold in two different
countries with different patient information leaflets or different la-
bels but identical chemical ingredients are treated as different
products. Hence, the admission process of Pharmaceuticals unintendedly
produces perfect market segmentation if viewed from a legal standpoint.
In reality this view has been contested. Since the late 1970's companies
appeared which tried to arbitrage Pharmaceuticals from low priced coun-
tries to high priced countries, mostly to Germany, the Netherlands and
the U.K. These companies bought, e.g., German Pharmaceuticals in France
or Italy and exported them to Germany or they bought Italian pharma-
ceuticals in Italy and they exported those parallel to the exports of
the producers to Germany. These reimports and parallel imports are
estimated to be rather small amounting to 150 mio. ECU in the EC in 1985
(EAG, 1988). For Germany a market share of one percent has been quoted
(Sachverstandigenrat fur das Gesundheitswesen, 1987) which - according
to industry representatives - has remained constant over the years up to
today. Companies specializing in reimporting pharmaceuticals report that
producers respond quickly to increased arbitrage by lowering prices in
high priced markets. The model below also indicates that a low volume of
reimports and parallel imports does not necessarily indicate little
pressure on market segmentation.
In Germany, arbitrage is done by approximately 5 to 6 large firms and a
larger number of smaller firms. Since these firms are required to be re-- 6 -
gistered as pharmaceutical producers and since their reimported or paral-
lel-imported products have to go through the national registration, arbi-
trage activities can not be performed on a hit-and-run basis. It is im-
possible to exactly assess the cost structure of arbitrage firms, but
there seem to be some setup costs, whereas marginal costs are relatively
flat until the producers of the arbitrage products actively try to pre-
vent arbitrage. Then marginal costs may be very steep.
The European court has already ruled in 1976 that reimports and parallel'
imports do not need a separate admission procedure - which is time con-
suming and expensive - if the products are identical. If there are thera-
peutically relevant differences between the products, then a new admis-
sion is necessary. This statement is at the heart of the matter of many
court rulings concerning reimports and parallel imports. National regu-
lations differ substantially. In the Netherlands, a simplified registra-
tion procedure can be used by arbitrageurs if the pharmaceutical has the
same chemical compounds and the same dosage. This procedure is frequent-
ly used (Hart/Reich (1990), pg. 250). Germany does not have a special
admission procedure for reimported Pharmaceuticals. It requires, however,
that the reimporting firm is registered as a pharmaceutical producer with
all the responsibilities for safety of the drugs which it sells. A recent
court ruling in 1989 has strongly increased the barriers for arbitrage
since it requires that in order to be identical products reimported phar-
maceuticals need to have identical names with those sold in Germany. The
federal court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) decided that the products
"Methorexat" sold in Germany and "Methorexate" sold in Italy which ex-
cept for the last letter are otherwise identical cannot be treated as
identical products. Arbitrage is therefore made very costly since the
reimported product must go through the complete admission process which
is time consuming and expensive. The UK has introduced a simplified ad-
mission procedure called PL (PI) - "product license - parallel import" -
which is granted for pharmaceuticals coming from EC-countries which are
identical in therapeutic quality to the product admitted in the UK by
the principal producer. Since many British parallel imports have come
from non-EC countries this ruling has limited the extent of arbitrage
between UK and non-EC countries.- 7 -
Taken together these regulations in countries with high prices for phar-
maceuticals, it is fair to conclude that arbitrage inside the EC is still
quite limited. It is costly since the imported products often have to be
repackaged, or since wholesalers in the exporting countries do not deli-
ver products to exporters, or since companies have reacted to court ru-
lings by exploiting the possibilities of product differentiation in or-
der to keep markets segmented as much as possible. Therefore national
admission processes which undoubtedly are necessary for health and safe-
ty reasons provide the basis for market segmentation. The question is
then as to whether the measures taken by the EC will attack this situa-
tion and will move pharmaceutical markets toward a unified internal mar-
ket without segmentation.
This market segmentation is also a necessary condition for the sustaina-
bility of price control measures which are taken by the majority of coun-
tries. The measured price differences (see table 1) therefore represent
a mixture of price discrimination imposed by profit maximizing firms and
price controls imposed by national health institutions. An elimination
of national price controls will therefore not necessarily lead to uni-
form prices within the EC. It is even an open question whether price dif-
ferences would be larger with than without price controls. Whether Euro-
pean directives towards easier arbitrage opportunities under unchanged
price control regimes will be sustainable is also unknown. The analysis
below will shed some light on these issues.
INITIATIVES TOWARDS AN INTERNAL MARKET
The commission of the EC has in the past already introduced a number of
measures to harmonize pharmaceutical markets. Their intended aim is to
secure a safe supply of Pharmaceuticals without limiting the development
of the European pharmaceutical industry and the free movement of goods
within Europe. Common criteria for the safety, efficacy and quality of
drugs are determined in the directives. Whereas in the past a producer
could register a drug only with the national authority of the country in
which the product was sold, a multi-country registration procedure has
been introduced.- 8 -
The multi-country procedure gave pharmaceutical companies the option to
obtain registration of a pharmaceutical product for the entire EC by sup-
plying first five and since 1983 only two national registrations to the
European Commission for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) which will
then evaluate the documents supplied by the company and give a positive
or negative recommendation to the member countries for accepting the na-
tional registrations in their countries without further delay. This pro-
cedure has not been used very much. The pharmaceutical industry accused
it of being too time consuming. In 1987 the CPMP has been given more
power through the rule requiring national authorities to include the CPMP
in registration processes for high technology drugs such as drugs pro-
duced with biotechnology.
Despite these efforts to harmonize registration procedures, the final
decision still remains within the national authorities. This also means
that pharmaceutical firms still have the option to obtain only national
admissions for their products. They can thus choose the degree of pro-
duct differentiation and market segmentation through "spurious" product
differentiation such as slight changes in the name of a drug, different
packaging, different dosage or different patient information.
New initiatives towards a harmonized registration within the EC go in
three directions (Hart/Reich, 1990): First, the establishing of the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition of registration; secondly an expansion of
the competence of the CPMP, yet without giving it registration authori-
ties, and finally the creation of a pan-European admission agency, the
"European Medicines Agency". The last proposal of the Commission of 1990
on a "Future System for the Free Movement of medicinal products within
the European Community" envisages on obligatory pan-European registra-
tion for bio-technically produced drugs and an optional one for high-
technology and new drugs. A decentralized procedure with mutual recogni-
tion of admissions is planned for drugs not in the two groups just men-
tioned but with European dimension. National authorities are therefore
responsible only for drugs with only a local market.
The so called "Transparency Directive" addresses the question of price
controls. The commission does not challenge price controls in general
but aims at making price control measures more transparent for those in-- 9 -
volved in the process by setting time limits on procedures or giving com-
panies more rights to challenge price controls. Under these rules price
controls can still be imposed, they may however be accompanied by higher
political costs if the decision processes become transparent and the al-
leged discrimination of foreign firms can be documented. If the initia-
tives and plans by the Commission of the EC toward an internal market
for Pharmaceuticals are accepted and implemented a first step toward a
unified market will be made. Through the pan-European registration of
bio-technology products market segmentation will be ruled out. For other
products companies may still use the option of segmenting markets through
national registration. Whether the European court will challenge some of
the national rules concerning arbitrage through reimports and parallel
imports is hard to predict, but some harmonization between, e.g., German
and Dutch rules will probably come about resulting in lower costs of ar-
bitrage. Price controls, on the other hand, seem to prevail.
The question then is which impact such a development of regulatory mea-
sures will have on pharmaceutical markets in Europe. What will happen to
price discrimination by firms? Will prices rise or fall? Will price con-
trols persist as arbitrage becomes easier? Another issue coming up with
a unified market with possibly uniform prices is the welfare issue. Con-
sumer surplus in countries whose prices will increase will surely expe-
rience losses, but even on a community level it is not clear whether a
move from the current system which is inefficient to a unified market
which, is also inefficient will increase or lower welfare. In order to
clarify these questions and to answer some of them, in the following a
simple model of a price discriminating firm faced with price controls in
one market but not the other is developed.
A MODEL OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION, PRICE CONTROLS, AND ARBITRAGE
Market Segmentation
Suppose a firm produces an ethical drug which is protected by patents
and serves a specific therapeutical group. There may be some substitutes
in that market segment, but essentially the firm will have a monopoly- 10 -
for its product - especially if it is the most advanced pharmaceutical;
for curing this specific illness. The pharmaceutical firm is assumed to
produce just one pharmaceutical x and sells in two markets, 1 and 2. It
has a cost function of producing x of the form
(1) c(x) = F + c-x
where F = Fix cost (R&D, etc.)
c = marginal cost,
hence there are constant marginal costs and increasing returns to .scale.
According to the discussion above this is a plausible assumption.
The firm's profit if it can price discriminate between markets will
then be given by







where x (p ) and x (p ) are the demand functions in market 1 and 2.
Profit maximization of the firm will yield the following first order con-
ditions
,3, *-*-
where e and e are the respective demand elasticities in the two mar-
kets. Equation shows that prices in the market with lower demand elas-
ticities (in absolute terms) will be higher. For the following it is as-
sumed without a loss of generality that |e > |e |, hence p > p .
Under a regime without market segmentation, the firm will set a uniform
price p such that its marginal revenue in both markets together will
equal its marginal cost, i.e.
(4) Pu (1 + ^- ) = c
where e = price elasticity in both markets together.- 11 -
Suppose now that prices are controlled by a regulatory agency in country
2 which fixes p at p . Since the pharmaceutical producer faces constant
marginal costs and the demand functions are independent the price in mar-
•n
ket 1 will remain at p whereas p = p . This result is illustrated in
Figure 1.
IT represents the profit maximizing price combination (p , p ) under third
R degree price discrimination. The isoprofit line labled TT goes through
— R
the price pair (p , p ) when prices are controlled in market 2. The tan-
gency point of the isoprofit line TT with the 45°-line, represents the
equilibrium without market segmentation, TT denotes price combinations
Figure 1
(p , p ) where profits of the firm are zero. Under the demand constella-
tion of the model prices in market 2 can be lowered to c through
controls. Then the firm will cease to supply that market but will still- 12 -
make profits in market 1. In market 1, however, prices cannot be regula-
ted downward beyond TT . Hence ]
cess in the low price markets.
ted downward beyond TT . Hence price controls have a higher chance of suc-
Arbitrage
Suppose now that markets are only imperfectly segmented. Goods can be
arbitraged between markets at some costs. There are arbitrageurs who sup-
ply parallel imports or reimports by buying in the low price market and
selling in the high price market. In order to perform this activity they
have additional costs of repackaging, of distribution, of sourcing, etc.
which may parametrically depend on the institutional structure of the
markets. Then the profit function of an arbitrageur would be where x
A.
(5) 7T
A(xA,a) = (Pl-P2)xA - cA(xA,a)
denotes the quantity which is bought, resp. sold, in the two markets and
c (•) is the cost function of arbitrage parameterized with a. It is as-
sumed that the cost function is convex, i.e.
c' = 6cA/dx. > 0, c" > 0. A A A A
The profit maximizing arbitrage x will then be given by
A
(6)
The supply function of the arbitrageur in market 1 will then be given as
the inverse of (6),
(7)
with x' > 0, x' < 0, x' > 0, where x' denotes the partial differen- Al AZ A Ai
 r
tial of the supply function with respect to p., and x' = <5x /<5(p -po).
X A A JL Z.
The signs follow from the strict convexity of the cost function.Bibliofhek
_ 13 - des Institute fur Weltwirts
The pharmaceutical firm will now recognize the behavior of arbitrageurs
which itself depends on the extent of the firm's own price discrimina-













- c [Xl(Pl) + x2(p2)] - F.
Maximization with respect to p and p then yields first order
conditions
(9) 0 = px 1 - -^-j [1- ^ (l+eA) ] - c
(10) 0 =
The familiar condition on third degree price discrimination given in (3)









e and e | are defined as the market demand elasticities net of arbi-
trage, e denotes the reaction elasticity of arbitrage with respect to
A.







A comparison of the first order conditions under price discrimination;
without arbitrage (equation 3) and with arbitrage (equation 11) shows
that arbitrage reduces the wedge between the two prices. The degree of
reduction then is determined by the two brackets on the right-hand side
of equation (11).
The degree of price discrimination by the pharmaceutical firm depends on
the extent to which arbitrage is made costly by the regulation of marke-
ting drugs in a country and of barriers to reimports or parallel imports.
This effect is captured by the parameter a. Suppose a high a represents
strict regulations such that the cost of arbitrage increase. Then the
extent of arbitrage will fall as a increases, dx /da < 0 and consequent-
A.
ly de /da < 0. Hence, with falling a, i.e. low cost of arbitrage, the
A
bracket in the numerator if equation (11) increases and it falls in the
denominator. In other words, the perceived price elasticity of the phar-
maceutical firm in market 2 falls and it rises in market 1. Since
|e | > |e | , the perceived elasticities will eventually equalize as a
falls and price discrimination will cease to exist. Conversely, as a in-








In'Figure 2 the line IT TT indicates the optimal price discrimination un-
der alternative costs of arbitrage. The comparative static results for
alternative costs of arbitrage are
if 2x^ + (p2-c)x£ < 0
if
if 2x^ + (p1-c)x
n1 < 0
if
The path of profit maximizing allocations under different arbitrage op-
portunities has a negative slope like in Figure 2 if both demand
functions are not too convex. It is also apparent that the sign of the












Price Controls with Arbitrage
The introduction of price controls in a model with perfectly segmented
markets leads to lower prices in the market in which the controls are
imposed but prices in the unconstrained market are not affected. This
follows immediately from the first order conditions of profit maximiza-
tion and is illustrated in Figure 1. Under arbitrage this independence
disappears since price controls increase the price dispersion between
the two markets such that arbitrage will increase in order to exploit
the new profit opportunities. Consequently, the producers will adjust
prices in the market without price controls such that their profits are
maximized given the behaviour of the arbitrageurs.- 16 -
If prices in market 2 are controlled by the authorities of that country,





The denominator is identical to the first diagonal term of the second-
order condition and is negative. The sign of the numerator depends on
the sign of x" which is ambivalent and which represents the shape of the
A. '
 m'
marginal cost curve of arbitrage.
If the arbitrage supply function, i.e. the marginal cost curve is.con-
cave , then the sign of equation (15) is uniquely positive, hence a reduc-
tion of the price in market 2 through administered price ceilings will
be accompanied by a reduction in the price in the uncontrolled market.
If however x" < 0 and (p -p )x" < -2x! then prices may be raised in mar- A. X 2- A A
ket 1 as a response to lower prices in market 2. This could happen, if
the marginal cost curves of the arbitrageurs is sufficiently convex.
Figure 3
Pi- 17 -
In Figure 3 an example is given where price controls at p initially in-
duce a reduction of the price p in market 1 such that R is the optimal
allocation. If the price in market 2 is further reduced to p^, then the
optimal decision by the producer will be to raise the price of good 1 in
order to compensate for the losses in market 2. The reason for such a
result comes from the fact that as p falls arbitrage will increase c.p.
resulting in a lower p . If, however, the marginal cost curves of the
arbitrageurs are sufficiently steep then it becomes profitable for the
producer to reduce the supply in market 1 since this reduction is not
matched by increased arbitrage.
The introduction of arbitrage and price controls will therefore lead to
either" a fall of prices in both markets or in a rising price in the un-
controlled and a lower price in the controlled market. The question which
case will occur is essentially an empirical one which is determined by
the shape of the marginal cost curve of arbitrage . Since arbitrage in-
volves the buying of large amounts of the commodity in the low price mar-
ket, it will not go unnoticed by the producer if the market share of re-
imported goods or parallel imports increase. Companies specializing in
the reimport of Pharmaceuticals report increasing difficulties of buying
large quantities from one wholesaler and have often to rely on a large
number of smaller suppliers. Such evidence suggests that a convex margi-
nal cost curve for arbitrage is more likely than a concave one. This, in
turn, would indicate that increasing arbitrage going hand in hand with
stricter price controls could be accompanied by rising prices in market
1. Or, vice versa, a more towards a unified European market may lower
prices in the high priced market if arbitrage was at its capacity li-
mits. It would result in rising prices in both markets if the reduced
arbitrage would result in only marginally lower marginal costs.
E.g. for a quadratic cost function, the line TTRQ has a positive
slope, hence stricter price controls in market 2 go hand in hand with
lower prices in market 1.- 18 -
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS
Pharmaceutical companies usually supply many different products in mar-
ket segments which are divided among therapeutic groups. Sometimes there
is only one producer supplying a dominating drug, in other cases there
are very few; very rarely, however, here is a larger number of suppliers.
The question is therefore whether the result which has been derived for
a monopoly in a market segment also holds for an oligopolistic market
structure. One can show that the same results can also be derived in a
Cournot-Nash framework.
Suppose there are two producers K, and L, which both sell in the two
markets 1 and 2 which have the same characteristics as before. The
supply of the two oligopolists is (x^-, . ^o)
 anc^ (x , x ). Under
Cournot-behaviour each producer will choose those quantities which
maximize his profits given the output of the other producer and given
the arbitrage which takes place between the two markets.
The profit of producer K is
(16)
and correspondingly for producer L. Arbitrage is determined correspon-












Under Cournot-behaviour each producer maximizes profits subject to the
constraint of the arbitrage between the two markets. The resulting reac-
tion functions are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 represents
the market with the high prices. Without arbitrage the Nash-equilibrium
is 7T where the reaction functions K , K' and L', L intersect. In the
presence of arbitrage, the reaction functions can not be uniquely deter-





Figure 5- 20 -
and xT_, but only as total market supply, i.e. jc +x or x +x . For a LI K.1 A LI A
specific arbitrage opportunity parameterized by a, the resulting equili-
brium market supplies are represented by TT (a) and the corresponding
supply in market 2 is TT (a) in Figure 5.
As in the monopoly case one can not predict which quantities are sup-
plied by the producers directly and which are supplied by arbitrageurs.
Yet, the comparative static results are the same as in the monopoly. If
arbitrage becomes more costly, i.e. da>0, then
dx TT TT dc"(x , a)
IS
where TT and TT are the second derivatives of the profit function (16)
and A is the determinant of the constraint maximization (16) and (17).
For each producer the sum of arbitrage supply and his own supply is also
negative, i.e.
where p ' is the first derivative of the demand function in market 1,
For market 2 we get symmetrically
dx TI 6c-(x , a)
-±- = - -^- ^
da da A da
(20) -^- - -±- = - -^- ^ p' > 0.
From equation (19) one can immediately see that with increased costs of
arbitrage the price in market 1 rises. Whether the price in market 2 ri-
ses or falls depends on how the demand of the arbitrageurs changes rela-
tive to the change in the supply of the producers. This is not uniquely
determined as in the monopoly case. Hence, the price discrimination equi-
libria as illustrated in Figure 2 carry over to the oligopoly.- 21 -
In the case of price controls the profit maximization of each firm as
given by equation (16) and the constraint (17) has the additional cons-






The comparative static results of this maximization also reveal that as
the price controls are loosened, i.e. dp > 0, the price difference will
be- reduced. Whether the price in market 1 falls or rises, again depends
on the slopes of the demand functions in the two markets.
WELFARE EFFECTS
The welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination has been investi-
gated by SCHMALENSEE (1981) and VARIAN (1985). Varian derives bounds an
the welfare change of different degrees of price discrimination and on
the difference in welfare between uniform pricing and profit-maximizing
price, discrimination. The basic necessary condition for an increase in
welfare when firm is moving from uniform pricing to price discrimination
is that output in both markets together must increase. This result de-
pends on profits of the firm as well as on consumer surplus. In analy-
zing the welfare effects of price controls at some given regulation of
arbitrage the results of Schmalensee and Varian can be used. One has on-
ly to use the additional assumption that arbitrage takes place in a per-
fectly competitive environment with zero profits. Then the welfare of
the overall region - assuming quasi-linear utility - is given by
r
f-00
X;L(v)dv + x2(v)dv + 7T(p ,p2,a)
*
 P P2
where TT(p ,p ,a) is defined by (8).
C
Figure 3 illustrates the results. W represents the welfare maximum al-
*
though at negative profits. W is the welfare optimum under a zero pro-
fit restriction illustrated by the iso-profit contour IT.. The dot-
TT °
ted line W TT contains the welfare optima under alternative profit- 22 -
constraints and given arbitrage opportunities a. These optima all in-
volve some degree of price discrimination. They do not, however,
correspond to equilibria given by price controls in either one market.
The line TT RQ corresponds to equilibria under alternative price con-
trol measures in market 2. One can show that the iso-welfare contours Wy
and W have negative slope for prices above marginal costs and there-
fore the tangency points with the iso-profit contours have a negative
slope as well. The points along TT RQ, however, are defined by zero
slopes of the iso-profit contours such that the line of price-con-
trol equilibria TTRQ lies always below the profit constrained welfare
* A
maxima W TT . It is also apparent that - as it is likely for the pharma-
ceutical market - with increasing price controls overall welfare will
first increase as long as prices in both markets fall, i.e. consumer
surplus rises faster than profits fall. But after equation (15) has
turned negative, i.e. the producer reacts to price controls with higher
prices in market 1 because of high costs of arbitrage, then welfare can
fall as price controls become tighter. From the arguments about the li-
kely slope of the line TTRQ above one can conclude that small price con-
trols increase welfare but large price controls probably lower welfare.
The welfare analysis of changes in the regulatory framework which deter-
mines the costs of arbitrage as it is represented by the parameter a are
more difficult to analyse. Changes in a without price controls move IT
along the line TT TT. Such movements are accompanied by new iso-profit
contours and by new iso-welfare contours which contain the profits of
the producing firm. It is therefore impossible to compare the welfare of
two equilibria determined by alternative a, i.e. alternative regulatory
regimes. One can, however, illustrate the impact of a on consumer sur-
plus alone.
In a situation without price controls anything can happen to consumer
surplus for both countries together when a is varied. The shape of
the line TT TT determines the welfare effect. In Figure 6 easier arbi-
trage first goes hand in hand with an increase in consumer surplus and
beyond TT consumer surplus begins to fall. Uniform prices then may or
may not yield higher consumer surplus then perfect price discrimination
for which the bound on welfare are given by VARIAN (1985).- 23 -
The sign of consumer surplus changes can be predicted when price con-
trols are imposed. If the price in market 2 is restricted to p (see Fi-
gure 6) and this control is not lifted as arbitrage becomes liberalized,
then consumer surplus will unambiguously increase. Total differentiation
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Figure 6 illustrates this case. Without price controls easier arbitrage
A A
would move the price discriminating prices from TT to Tf and finally to
TT . Whereas these movements are accompanied first by a rise in consumer
surplus and later by a fall, the equilibria under prices controlled at
R R
p which are represented by the intersection of the p -line with the dot-
ted lines yield increasing consumer surplus throughout. It should be men-
tioned, however, that the profits of the pharmaceutical firm fall and
eventually it will make negative profits. Before such a situation arises
the firm may also stop supplying market 2 and set the price in market- 1
as in the unconstrained case. This situation has recently occurred when
a German pharmaceutical company has stopped to supply the Greek market
because the price controls and the induced arbitrage opportunities were
unacceptable for that firm.
THE LIKELY IMPACT OF HARMONIZATION
The commission of the EC has addressed in the directives on market trans-
parency and on the authorization of medicinal products the two eminent
issues, namely market segmentation and price controls. The directives in
both issues will surely not create an internal market for pharmaceuti-
cals; they will rather induce some slight moves towards an unified Euro-
pean market. Two immediate questions then arise: What will happen to pri-
ces in the national markets and what might be the likely welfare effects
of moves towards unification?
The transparency directive requires national authorities to lay open
their procedures and guidelines in controlling and authorizing prices of
Pharmaceuticals. Although it is not a ban on price controls, it is hoped
that the new regulations will pressure national authorities to end dis-
criminatory practices and will therefore lead to less restrictive price
setting for products from foreign countries. According to market insi-
ders, companies already get more freedom to price their newly introduced
products according to their interests. Arbitrageurs also report that new
products exhibit lower price differences than in the past.- 25 -
The model presented here does not uniquely predict the likely outcome of
an easing of price controls. One can, however, expect that in cases
where arbitrage is very costly, price differences are large, and the
cost function is strongly convex, a reduction in price controls is accom-
panied by falling prices in the unrestricted market as it is commonly
expected. If, on the other hand, arbitrage is relatively easy then it is
more likely that the optimal response of pharmaceutical companies to less
price controls will be to raise prices in the unrestricted market. The
outcome of the transparency directive would then be falling consumption
accompanied by rising prices in both markets.
Statistical information about the shape of the cost curve of arbitra-
geurs is not available. According to company officials arbitrage invol-
ves some set up costs for the registration of the products which are to
be reimported, but otherwise the marginal cost of arbitrage seem to be
rather flat. If this is generally the case, then it is less likely that
less restrictive price controls are accompanied by falling prices in the
unrestricted market.
The welfare impacts of the transparency directive depend on price respon-
ses as well. The welfare of the EC overall may slightly increase through
movements from, e.g., Q to R in Figure 3 if the path TT RQ has a suffi-
ciently negative slope between R and Q. It is more likely, however, that
welfare declines because the losses of consumer surplus in the price con-
trolled market and possibly the unrestricted market will not be out-
weighed by increasing profits of the pharmaceutical companies.
The existing procedures for the authorization of Pharmaceuticals and the
proposed procedures leave open alternative ways for pharmaceutical com-
panies to introduce new products. With the exception of biotechnology
products they can still choose national authorization. These options
have been demanded by the industry organization in order to have the
choice of the most cost effective and fastest admission system. Yet,
this option still entails the choice to segment markets by obtaining
different national admissions for the same chemical entity, e.g. under
different names. One can therefore predict that as long as price dis-- 26 -
crimination is sufficiently profitable - e.g. because of price controls
or because of different demand elasticities - the community procedures
such as multistate registration will not be used extensively. Still,
arbitrage will become alleviated somewhat in the future.
It has been shown in the model that institutional changes which facili-
tate arbitrage represent movements along the path between perfect price
discrimination and uniform pricing such as TTTT in Figure 6. Since the
present situation also entails price controls the starting point- would
be an allocation like R (Figure 6). If price controls remain in place
the new admission procedures will move prices from R to R , i.e. only
prices in unrestricted markets fall. In that case profits will fall and
consumer surplus will increase. If, on the other hand, price controls
are partially lifted as well this would be represented by a move from R
towards some point along the line R TT . The impact on consumer surplus
would be ambivalent and would among others depend on the shape of the
line TT TT .
If the goal is to reach uniform pricing in European markets it is clear
that facilitating arbitrage is the most powerful policy since it moves
pharmaceutical firms at unchanged price controls quickly towards their
zero profit contour. This puts pressure on national authorities to lift
price controls or to risk having their market not supplied by the com-
pany in question as it has been the case in Greece where a German firm
has ceased to supply the Greek market. Lifting price controls alone could
not eliminate market segmentation since, given the existing income dif-
ferences within the EC and different demand structures, it would still
be profitable to exploit the different price elasticities.
A welfare analysis in segmented markets raises the general question to
which situation one wants to compare the current situation. Since the
welfare maximum with marginal cost pricing is not achievable one could
use a constrained welfare maximum, e.g. with a zero profit constraint as
shown by W* in Figure 3. Yet, this second best optimum also leads to some
degree of price discrimination, hence the equilibrium with uniform pri-
ces TT is not even second best. The problem then is that the publicly
announced goal of creating an internal market by eliminating market seg-- 27 -
mentation does not lead to a second best situation as described by
A C
points along W*"n in Figure 3, not to speak of the first best W which
includes subsidies to firms. It is therefore not surprising that the
policy initiatives by the Commission which are discussed here lead to
welfare losses or at best to ambivalent results.
The question whether market segmentation should be eliminated at all is
not discussed in detail here, only a few remarks should be made. If one
believes that pharmaceutical markets are competitive markets then this
competition without price controls will lead to price discriminating equi-
libria IT which are close to the constrained welfare maximum W* since com-
petition through entry in the different pharmaceutical markets will drive
down profits. But then only distributional judgements could determine
whether such price discrimination should be maintained or eliminated.
The fact that pharmaceutical companies are international and import pene-
tration is high in all markets suggest a rather competitive environment.
Hence, the possible argument for a unification of markets because of li-
mited competition does not seem too convincing.- 28 -
Literature
Commission of the European Communities (1988): "The Economics of 1992".
European Economy, No. 35.
Commission of the European Communities (1988): "The Cost of Non-Europe
in the Pharmaceutical Industry". Research on the Cost of Non-Eu-
rope, Basic Findings, Vol. 15, Brussels.
Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH (1985): "Arzneimittel-Parallel- und Re-
import", Piding.
Hart, D. und Reich, N. (1990): "Integration und Recht des Arzneimittel-
marktes und in der EG", Bd. 13, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-
Baden.
Sachverstandigenrat fUr die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen
(1987): "Jahresgutachten 1987: Medizinische und bkonomische Orien-
tierung", Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden.
Schmalensee, R., "Ouput and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination". In: The American Economic Review,
Vol. 71, 1981.
Thier, U. (1990): "Das Recht des EG-Arzneimittelmarktes und des freien
Warenverkehrs", Europaische Hochschulschriften, Reihe II, Bd. 951,
Frankfurt/M.
Varian, H.R., "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare". In: The Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 75, 1985.